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The Manifesto Group of centre-right Labour MPs was established in 
December 1974 to combat the growing organizational strength and 
success of the left-wing Tribune Group in elections to Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) offi  ce, and to buttress the 1974 Labour government against 
the general advance of the left within the party. It was also an attempt to 
respond to the emerging incoherence of the personnel and programme 
of revisionist social democracy and to attempt to organize the centre-right 
of the PLP under a single banner. In policy terms, it concerned itself inevi-
tably with analysis of economic and industrial policy, both as a critique of 
the perceived limitations of Labour’s attachment to conventional tools of 
Keynesian social democratic political economy as it crumbled in the 1970s 
and as a ‘moderate’ social democratic ‘third way’ response to the emerging 
alternatives of the Labour left’s Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) and 
the neo-liberalism of the New Right. Much of the meaning and impact of 
Manifesto Group ideas and proposals were lost in the context and clamour 
of economic crisis and polarized political divisions of the time. With recent 
claims of adherence to ideas and politics that claim to chart a ‘third way’ 
course through the mire of discrete and outmoded ideologies, emerging 
themes, ideas, and proposals of the Manifesto Group retrospectively 
possess greater resonance for analysis of the subsequent development 
of social democracy and social democratic political economy and emer-
gence of ‘New’ Labour. The article argues that Blair’s Labour Party was less 
a simple compact of internal and external political infl uences than the 
legatee of the interrupted and circuitous trajectory of post-revisionist 
social democracy from deferred Manifesto Group themes through the 
(Owenite) SDP, Labour’s own Policy Review after the 1987 election defeat, 
and indirectly to ‘New’ Labour.
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Introduction
In debates concerning the familiar question of the ideological and political 
character and trajectory of ‘New’ Labour, much has been written of its 
revisionist social democratic antecedents as an antidote to the more imme-
diate ‘accommodation of Thatcherism’ thesis of left-leaning commentators, 
or the ‘year zero’ rhetoric of leading Labour modernisers.1 ‘New’ Labour’s 
initially infl uential ‘Third Way’ approach to the application of ideas and 
policies has also been the subject of some scrutiny of its relative novelty and 
associations.2 However, lost amongst the debris of so-called ‘Old’ Labour’s 
diffi culties and battles of the 1970s, the external and internal diffi culties that 
beset the 1974–9 Labour government, a line of revisionist social democratic 
continuity between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labours has been neglected. Little has 
been written of some of the striking parallels between the ideas, remedies, 
and prescriptions of the Manifesto Group of centre-right Labour MPs, set up 
initially in 1974 to counteract the advance and success of left-wing groups in 
the party organization,3 and ‘New’ Labour’s concept of ‘Third Way’ politics. 
For Blair, Giddens, and company, the ‘Third Way’ approach was not merely 
an attempt to ‘split the difference’ between right and left but to move ‘deci-
sively beyond an Old Left preoccupied by state control, high taxation and 
producer interests, and a New Right treating public investment, and often 
the very notions of ‘society’ and collective endeavour, as evils to be undone’. 
It advocated broadly the belief that it is possible to combine a largely free 
market economy with social justice, to promote a strong sense of community 
and stake holding while extending rather than restricting the liberty of the 
individual and wider opportunities for all.4 It is a contention of this article 
that ‘New’ Labour’s chosen ideological framework did not so much represent 
the ‘new type of politics’ and ‘new synthesis’ of ideas claimed by the party’s 
1 See Steven Fielding, The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour 
(Manchester, 2002); Tudor Jones, Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair (London, 
1996); Philip Larkin, ‘New Labour and old revisionism’, Renewal, 8 (2000), 42–9.
2 See Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism (Cambridge, 1998); 
Sarah Hale, Will Leggett, and Luke Martell (eds), The ‘Third Way’ and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures 
and Alternatives (Manchester, 2004); Martin Powell (ed.), New Labour, New Welfare State? The ‘Third 
Way’ in British Social Policy (Bristol, 1999).
3 British Library of Political and Economic Science (hereafter BLPES), London, Neville Sandelson 
Papers, 6/1, Memo, n.d.; Labour History Archive and Study Centre (hereafter LHA), Manchester, 
Labour Party Manifesto Group Papers, LP/MANIF/15, Giles Radice, ‘Note on the Manifesto 
Group’s future’, 14 January 1981; Financial Times, 9 March 1977.
4 See Tony Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century (London, 1998); Anthony Giddens, 
The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge, 1998); Peter Mandelson and Roger 
Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver? (London, 1996).
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leading modernisers,5 as the contemporary mainstream expression by a newly 
dominant political project of disrupted and displaced post-revisionist social 
democratic themes previously pursued by a relatively obscure and embattled 
centre-right Labour faction of the 1970s. The very little that has been written 
of the Manifesto Group has largely focused on its narrow instrumental oper-
ation as an internal organizational faction to combat the left in the Labour 
Party and presented as largely ineffective and transitory its contribution to 
wider debates and developments of social democracy.6 The group’s own 
records lie largely untouched in the Labour History Museum and Study 
Centre of the People’s History Museum in Manchester and in a section of 
the little-known right-wing Labour MP and Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
convert Neville Sandelson’s papers in the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science at the London School of Economics.
In its attempt to expand its initial narrow tactical party goals and develop a 
broader ideological strategy and programme for Labour and social democracy 
that would both underpin the future of a Labour government and promote 
a moderate socialist approach and agenda ‘fi rmly committed to the demo-
cratic socialist values of personal freedom and social equality’, the Manifesto 
Group claimed to offer a modernizing ‘middle way’ or ‘third possible course’ 
between the emerging extremes of left and right.7 Following initial analysis 
of the issues and problems of the prevailing economic situation by leading 
members, including John Horam and David Marquand,8 the fi rst and most 
extensive public statement of group principles and policy was eventually 
published in March 1977 to reasonable press coverage. It presented the broad 
scope of Manifesto Group philosophy and approach to the kind of ‘radical 
and constructive change’ that it believed was required, and modernizing 
sentiments concerning the need for change in the ‘backward-looking national 
psychology and backward-looking institutions’. Prepared by a sub-committee 
of Manifesto Group ‘intellectuals’ of a clearly revisionist social democratic 
temperament, composed of Horam and Marquand, John Mackintosh, Bryan 
Magee, Giles Radice, and John Roper, and excepting the prevailing idiom 
5 Mandelson and Liddle, Blair Revolution, 17.
6 See Radhika Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism: ‘Social Democrats’ and the Labour Party (London, 1994), 
170–2; Dianne Hayter, Fightback! Labour’s Traditional Right in the 1970s and 1980s (Manchester, 
2005), 49–75.
7 LHA, LP/MANIF/18, Manifesto Group, What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to 
Britain’s Crisis, March 1977; LP/MANIF/20, Manifesto Group, Priorities for Labour: A Manifesto 
Group Statement, March 1979, 1–2; Guardian, 9 March 1977; The Times, 30 September 1977.
8 Sandelson 6/1, David Marquand, ‘Economic situation’; John Horam, ‘The present situation’; John 
Horam, ‘The economy: A report for the Manifesto Group’; Manifesto Group, ‘Economic report 
by the Manifesto Group’ for a meeting with Denis Healey, 27 February 1975.
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of the time, the document set out an alternative and potentially less divisive 
‘democratic socialist’ programme of economic and social change to the 
‘equally old-fashioned’ schemes of Conservatism and Marxist socialism and 
to those of the new ‘prophets of Left and Right’.9
This article indicates the emerging weaknesses and divisions of revisionist 
social democratic political economy in the context of the broader crisis of 
Keynesian social democracy in the 1970s, before moving on to examine 
an attempt from within this tradition to formulate and chart an alternative 
‘middle course’ or ‘third way’ post-revisionist economic and industrial 
strategy. It considers the context, emergence, and nature of Manifesto Group 
themes, ideas, and policies, and assesses the immediate impact and longer-term 
signifi cance of its proposals. It suggests a neglected ‘Old’ Labour link in the 
evolution of so-called ‘New’ Labour’s ‘Third Way’ ideational framework, 
and, in a number of senses, the concerns of the ‘Old’ Labour centre-right 
Manifesto Group pre-empt many of the central themes and priorities of the 
‘new’ social democratic political economy of New Labour. Utilizing the 
under-used resource of the Manifesto Group papers, among others, the article 
seeks to illuminate the story of the Manifesto Group, its origins and rationale, 
its central concerns and contribution to social democratic politics, and its 
relative success (or lack of it) and social democratic legacy. It argues that, 
in the context of Labour politics of the time, its message and prescriptions 
became lost in the combination and clamour of events, developments, and 
battles overtaking the Labour government and Labour Party. Retrospectively, 
however, we can, in much of the post-revisionist analysis, perspectives, and 
proposals (and even some of the personnel) of the Manifesto Group, largely 
overlooked at the time and since and temporarily redirected through alter-
native social democratic channels, identify signifi cant parallels and continuity 
with ‘New’ Labour thought and practice.
1976 and all that: the ‘frontiers’ and crisis of revisionist social democracy 
and a ‘post-revisionist’ agenda
Commentators have viewed the 1970s, particularly the events and devel-
opments around 1975–6, as precipitating a number of a hugely signifi cant 
transitions in both Britain’s post-war political history and political economy. 
The period witnessed the related developments of the failure and demise 
9 Manifesto Group, What We Must Do, 4, 5–8, 36; Guardian, 9 March 1977.
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of Keynesian economic strategy, which, in turn, undermined the tradi-
tional basis of social democratic political economy, the end of the supposed 
post-war consensus, and the emergence of an alternative ideological approach 
to economic policy. After 1976, the ideological basis of political economy was 
transformed, with fresh emphasis on the reduction and control of infl ation as 
opposed to the maintenance of full employment and policies of redistribution 
through the tools of progressive taxation and public expenditure. Signalling 
a deep crisis of traditional social democratic political economy, the Labour 
government of these years appeared to have undergone a macroeconomic 
conversion of signifi cant proportions. Callaghan’s (in)famous decree on the 
limits of traditional Keynesian mechanisms was fashioned by his son-in-law, 
Peter Jay. Although Callaghan stopped shy of using the second half of Jay’s 
preferred elegy indicating the need to adopt a more entrepreneurial ‘market 
socialist’ approach, his words were taken to signal a turning point in modern 
British politics away from the traditional economic policies and instruments 
of the post-war consensus, and, for some, the death throes of Keynesian social 
democracy in an emerging era of so-called ‘New Realism’.10
Doubts remain over the extent to which Callaghan’s conference speech 
and contraction of Keynesianism marked an immediate or wholesale shift 
of post-war economic policy in the direction of neo-liberal monetarist 
doctrine. The post-1976 economic policy of the Labour government was 
little different to that pursued prior to the visit of the international fi nanciers 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its macroeconomic strategy, 
with continued emphasis on incomes policy, remained distinct from that of 
the early Thatcher years.11 Nonetheless, Callaghan’s rhetorical fl ourish, tacitly 
acknowledging the need to incorporate monetarist elements into the govern-
ment’s, and Labour’s, economic strategy and sewing the fi rst seeds of the slow 
transition along the ‘Yellow Brick Road … from Attlee’s Little Way to Blair’s 
Third Way’, found succour in elements of Labour’s centre-right increasingly 
unconvinced of the virtues of ‘high tax-and-spend’ as an ‘article of faith’ in 
the post-IMF economic environment.12 Although there was little in the way 
10 Labour Party, Labour Party Annual Conference Report (LPACR) (London, 1976), 188; Andy Beckett, 
When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London, 2009), 337–9; Denis Healey, The Time 
of My Life (London, 1991), 443.
11 Katherine Burk and Alec Cairncross, ‘Goodbye, Great Britain’: The 1976 IMF Crisis (London, 
1992), 228; Christopher Allsopp, ‘Macroeconomic policy: Design and performance’, in Michael 
Artis and David Cobham (eds), Labour’s Economic Policies 1974–79 (Manchester, 1991), 34–6.
12 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Social Democracy’, in Anthony Seldon (ed.), Blair’s Britain 1997–2000 
(Cambridge, 2007), 169–71; Tom Clark, The Limits of Social Democracy? Tax and Spend Under 
Labour, 1974–79 (London, 2001); Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘James Callaghan 1976–80’, in Kevin 
Jeffreys (ed.) Leading Labour: From Keir Hardie to Tony Blair (London, 1999), 134, 149; Kenneth 
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of a new overarching economic philosophy beyond the ‘minutiae of anti-in-
fl ationary policy’ to replace the ‘passing of Croslandism’, Manifesto Group 
members were infl uential in promoting the need for a ‘careful review of 
public expenditure and anti-infl ation measures’ in ‘conditions of low growth’ 
and to ensure the maintenance of basic ‘freedoms in society’. It represented a 
‘post-ideological’ pragmatic ‘adjustment’ to ‘facts of slow economic growth’ 
and, perhaps with the exception of the strong emphasis on incomes policy, 
could be distinguished from Conservative presentation by no more than a 
‘feeling’, which more recently might be described as ‘Blairite’.13
In a party that by 1974 was already an ‘uneasy alliance’, elements of Labour’s 
centre-right nucleus were more receptive to the possibilities and priorities 
of ‘new thinking’ on economic policy within emerging macroeconomic 
constraints.14 Particularly, a developing school of thought of the post-revi-
sionist Labour right was increasingly sensitive to the perceived failures and 
limitations of Anthony Crosland’s previously infl uential revisionist analysis of 
the egalitarian ends of social democratic political economy based on corre-
spondingly high levels of taxation and public expenditure. The purchase and 
likely success of the principles and goals of Crosland’s original revisionist thesis 
were to a large extent dependent on optimistic expectations of economic 
growth, which subsequently failed to materialize. 
Crosland’s apparent unwillingness to revise his own social democratic 
revisionism in light of subsequent trends in the structural economy led a 
number of his former social democratic disciples to attempt to reassess and 
reconfi gure key features and goals of social democratic political economy in 
the context of economic circumstances unanticipated by Crosland.15 Much 
of this second- wave revisionist analysis was channelled through the Manifesto 
Group. They appeared willing to re-evaluate the application of traditional 
tools and priorities of social democratic political economy and to question 
even revisionist social democratic perspectives of the rationale and use of tax-
ation and public expenditure in the face of the likely breach of structural limits 
O. Morgan, ‘Leadership and change: Prime ministers in the post-war world – James Callaghan’ 
Gresham College Lecture (London, 2007) (http://www.gresham.ac.uk/event.asp?Page-
Id=45&EventId=601: accessed 1 October 2010).
13 Clark, Limits of Social Democracy, 37; Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism, 171, 172; Manifesto Group, 
What We Must Do, 2–4; David Marquand, interview with the author, 16 January, 2001; John 
Tomlinson, interview with the author, 27 March 2001.
14 Clark, Limits of Social Democracy, 35.
15 Bodleian Library (hereafter BL), Oxford, uncatalogued papers of Lord Callaghan , ‘Tony Crosland 
memorial lecture’, 2 November 1979; David Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd 
George to Blair (London, 1999), 170; Giles Radice, ‘Revisionism revisited’, Socialist Commentary, 
May 1974, 25–7.
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of the economy in the 1970s. In effect, they were as increasingly concerned 
with the limits and implications of ‘tax and spend’ socialism as they were with 
the evolving neo-liberal direction of Conservative economic policy and, if it 
was unclear whether they were willing to question both the traditional means 
and ends of revisionist social democracy, to borrow archetypal Croslandite 
discourse, they were certainly increasingly sensitive to the ‘art of the possible’ 
in terms of the relative emphasis afforded to the prerequisite of economic 
growth and ideas of equality and liberty in public policy.
Organizing against the left and the road to a ‘third way’: origins and 
development of the Manifesto Group
The growing infl uence of the Labour left in the party after the 1970 general 
election defeat, partly in response to the perceived failures of the Wilson 
governments, in which infl uential fi gures of the centre-right were seen as 
culpable, precipitated the emergence of identifi able ‘moderate’ factional party 
groupings for the fi rst time since the Campaign for Democratic Socialism 
(CDS) in the early 1960, both to counter the progress of the left in the party 
and to pursue specifi c agendas in relation to economic and industrial issues 
and policy. The leftward shift of the party was refl ected in the publication 
of Labour’s Programme 1973, which advocated radical proposals of nationali-
zation, economic planning, and wealth redistribution,16 and in the subsequent 
formation of the left-wing Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) 
in 1973 to promote internal constitutional reforms designed to benefi t the 
left in the wider organs of the party structure.17
As a statement of the left-wing institutional and policy challenge, the 
long-time leftwinger, Ian Mikardo, was elected to the chairmanship of the 
PLP in 1974, and Tony Benn’s star was rising in the party as chair of the infl u-
ential Home Policy Committee of Labour’s National Executive Committee 
(NEC). Together with the perception of the onset of aggressive industrial 
action and potential challenge to the rule of law in response to developments 
such as the Heath government’s Industrial Relations bill, Labour’s previously 
dominant tradition of moderate social democracy was sensitive to the rising 
left-wing tide and began to warn of the dangers of a ‘populist socialist’ appeal 
to sectional and class-based politics and the need for a ‘renewed emphasis 
16 Labour Party, Labour’s Programme 1973 (London, 1973), 13–39, 40–2. 
17 Labour Party, Labour’s Programme 1973, 6.
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on parliamentary democracy’ in the national interest.18 With an echo of the 
attempts of 1950s Labour revisionism to counter the effects of ‘affl uence’ on 
the party’s appeal, some ‘moderates’ perceptively expressed concern over the 
ability of the increasingly disparate ideas and personnel of centre-right social 
democracy to return the party to a path of moderation necessary to appeal to 
an increasingly diverse and ‘dealigned’ electorate. Brian Walden, for instance, 
expressed the belief that ‘the Right was clapped out and ideologically inco-
herent’ and, in the adverse circumstances, ‘did not know what to do’.19 
The narrow election victory of October 1974 served only to conceal trends 
that indicated the decline of Labour’s electoral support, and prefi gured the 
invasive rise of the Labour left in the party and growing trade union militancy 
that included a shift to the left among a number of trade union leaderships.20 
The dilemmas and confl icts of the Labour Party were to be compounded 
rather than moderated by election victory and experience of offi ce. It was in 
the context of left-wing, trade union, and wider pressures on the economic 
and industrial policies of the Labour government, and the success of left-wing 
organization and activity in the PLP, that Labour’s centre-right determined to 
attempt to halt their relative institutional and intellectual decline and organize 
more formally through the Manifesto Group.
The Manifesto Group was a group of eighty or so Labour MPs with 
origins largely on the centre-right of the party, as noted, established initially 
in December 1974 to confront the shift in the balance of election to party 
offi ce leftwards, particularly the success of the left-wing Tribune Group in 
this respect. The election of Mikardo demonstrated the increasing organiza-
tional cohesion and effectiveness of the parliamentary Labour left and alarmed 
many of the traditional centre-right majority. It drew attention to the fact 
that, in important elections to the various offi ces and signifi cant channels of 
the PLP, the centre-right vote was often split between two or more candi-
dates and allowed the highly organized Tribune Group to elect their chosen 
candidate. In addition to the chairman of the PLP, Tribune members domi-
nated both the Liaison Committee of the PLP, the important channel of 
communication between Labour backbenchers and Labour government, and 
the leadership of backbench subject groups. Given the inroads already made 
18 John P. Mackintosh, ‘Socialism or Social Democracy? The choice for the Labour Party’, Political 
Quarterly, 43 (1972), 484; Roy Jenkins, What Matters Now (London, 1972), 21–2.
19 Quoted in Gerard Daly, ‘The Crisis in the Labour Party 1974–81 and the Origins of the 1981 
Schism’, PhD thesis, University of London, 1992, 75; BLPES, Reginald Prentice Papers, 6/5, 
‘Recollections of a trade unionist’.
20 See David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974 (London, 
1974), 268; BLPES, Prentice 6/5, ‘Recollections of a Trade Unionist’, 9–10.
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in the research and policy spheres of the party, it looked increasingly possible 
that the future programme of a Labour government could be underscored 
by potential left-wing economic and anti-EEC measures. In the absence of a 
single leader of the Gaitskell variety who might be able to unite the centrist 
and revisionist social democratic right in the face of the left-wing onslaught, 
a number of concerned junior lieutenants, including Horam, Marquand, 
Radice, Roper, Cledwyn Hughes, Dickson Mabon, Neville Sandelson, and 
Alan Lee Williams, took it upon themselves to initiate organized representation 
of the Labour right in the PLP.21
Although the Manifesto Group was not the same as, or merely a formal 
extension of, the emerging ‘Jenkinsite’ tendency of the revisionist Labour 
right around the leadership of Roy Jenkins, some overlap of personnel and 
perspective between the groups favoured more formal social democratic 
organization in the party.22 Unlike the Jenkinsites (and the Tribune Group), 
however, the Manifesto Group remained an exclusively backbench organi-
zation of the PLP, which precluded the involvement of Labour’s frontbench 
representatives, largely on the grounds that ‘only by being clearly independent 
of the Government will our voice be heard.’23 
Because of fear of the proliferation of the ‘Prentice effect’ of left-wing 
reprisals in constituency Labour parties (CLPs), the group refused to publish 
its membership list,24 but did constitute ‘a formal group’ in terms of organ-
ization, structure, and membership. It ‘met in … a committee room in the 
House of Commons and it did have offi cers and an agenda’.25 The Manifesto 
Group ‘was formed to deal with a purely Parliamentary situation’ and it 
remained a ‘purely Parliamentary’ organization. Initially, ‘its focus on PLP 
elections’ meant that only Labour MPs were eligible for membership, but 
Labour peers were then included as ‘many of them showed interest in the 
Group and because the Group itself inevitably widened its interest to include 
discussion of Government policy and of democratic socialism in general’. 
21 BLPES, Sandelson 6/1, note headed ‘The Manifesto Group’, n.d.
22 Although support for the manifesto on which Labour was elected in 1974 was as far as the 
Manifesto Group was prepared to go, even this would have been too far for some Jenkinsites 
given the relatively left-wing tone and substance of the document. For discussion of the relative 
distinctiveness and overlap of the Jenkinsite group, see Stephen Meredith, ‘Factionalism on the 
parliamentary right of the British Labour Party in the 1970s: A reassessment’, Contemporary British 
History, 21 (2007), 55–85.
23 LHA, LP/MANIF/23, John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson, 3 February 1978 and 27 February 1978.
24 BLPES, Prentice 6/17, ‘Recollections of a trade unionist’, ch. 7; Sandelson, ‘The Manifesto 
Group’; John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson, 3 February 1978 and 27 February 1978; LP/MANIF/9, 
George Robertson to Manifesto Group members, January 1980; LP/MANIF/25, Dennis Canavan 
to Ian Wrigglesworth, 18 March 1979; Ian Wigglesworth to Dennis Canavan, 20 March 1979. 
25 Marquand, interview with the author.
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The membership, which by early 1979 had reached ‘about sixty back-
bench Labour MP[s] in addition to about fi fteen Labour peers’, paid an 
annual subscription, but, with the exception of the frontbench disqualifi -
cation, there was ‘no formal criteria of membership’. Original members ‘got 
together because they shared views on relevant matters, and the Group is 
loose enough for the question of “suitability” not to arise’. In terms of offi cers, 
group members nominated and elected a chairman, three vice-chairman, a 
treasurer, and a secretary at the beginning of each parliamentary session in 
November. The Group also received funding from the Joseph Rowntree 
Social Service Trust to employ a full-time researcher/administrator.26 
The organizational structure of the group was based around a weekly 
meeting on a Wednesday evening in the parliamentary session open to all 
group members. Occasional open meetings were also organized, open to all 
members of the PLP. Contact between offi cers of the group was constant 
and informal, and it was suggested that ‘the Group, like most Parliamentary 
bodies, works informally rather than through rigid procedures’. Apart from the 
Rowntree Trust grant, the main sources of income came from membership 
subscriptions and small amounts from the sale of its periodic policy statements. 
With the exception of these occasional pamphlets, the group did not release 
regular publications and had ‘no “internal documentation” that it would be 
worthwhile … reading’.27
Although the Manifesto Group aimed to offer reinforcement to the belea-
guered Labour government, unlike its right-wing factional predecessor, the 
Gaitskellite Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS), its relationship with 
the parliamentary leadership was never better than ambiguous. The new 
leader, Callaghan, was opposed to the idea of intra-party groupings of all types 
and unwilling to endorse even factions of the centre-right leadership-loyalist 
variety, such as the Manifesto Group. After his election to the party leadership 
in April 1976, Callaghan declared that would ‘not be willing to accept a situ-
ation in which minority groups in the Parliamentary Labour Party manoeuvre 
in order to foist their views on the party as a whole’.28 Although it had been 
the nature of the centre-right to look to the elected leader for patronage and 
26 John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson , 27 February 1978; LP/MANIF/25, John Wakefi eld to Roger 
Poole, 23 January 1979.
27 John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson , 27 February 1978; John Wakefi eld to Roger Poole, 23 January 
1979; Ian Wrigglesworth, Tribune, 30 December 1977; LP/MANIF/4, Ian Wrigglesworth, ‘Notes 
on Manifesto Group meeting’, 11 January 1978; LP/MANIF/7, George Robertson to Ron 
Hayward, March 1980.
28 The Times, 22 April 1976; BL, uncatalogued Callaghan papers, speeches and speech notes, 79–80, 
speech to the All Wales Rally, Brecon, 5 July 1980.
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leadership, Callaghan was ‘cautious about endorsing a campaign conducted 
in his name’. He had long been averse to any divisive factional activity and 
‘groups running around in the party fl ogging their minority wares’. For 
Callaghan, it was unity that mattered most and he wanted to ‘command the 
soft [left and] centre as well as the right’.29 
Others, such as David Owen, Denis Healey, Bill Rodgers, and Roy 
Hattersley, were more sympathetic to the group’s aims and ideals, but as 
ministers none could be seen to openly endorse the group and generally it 
was ‘provided with no protective shield’ by the parliamentary leadership, 
whether it was the ‘left-wing Harold Wilson or, perhaps surprisingly, the 
more right-wing Callaghan, who saw his role as a balancing one, rather than 
as favouring either side’.30 
Equally, a further irony and diffi culty for the group was the nature of the 
manifesto from which it drew its name. A declared aim of the group in its 
‘independently’ supportive role of the Labour government and party leadership 
was to help uphold the party’s 1974 election manifesto, even if a majority 
of its membership was ambivalent or opposed to much of its substance, not 
least the ‘sweeping nationalization proposals and … revolutionary sounding 
promise of a “fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and 
wealth in favour of working people and their families”’.31 The point was that 
the manifesto was the limit of how far they were prepared to go to implement 
socialism, and in the context of increasing economic and industrial diffi culties 
the Manifesto Group developed its limited initial objectives to support and 
implement the party manifesto and act as an organizational counterweight 
to the Tribune Group and update the ideological parameters of ‘democratic 
socialism’. 
Initially, the Manifesto Group campaign to overturn Tribune Group 
victories in elections to important posts of the PLP met with a good degree 
of success. In the PLP elections held after the October 1974 general election, 
Cledwyn Hughes was elected to the chair as a single unifying candidate of the 
Labour centre-right. There was also a signifi cant improvement in the election 
of its preferred candidates to the important Liaison Committee of the PLP, 
and it was claimed that after ‘the formation of the Manifesto Group its candi-
dates were elected to all the backbench seats on the Liaison Committee and 
29 LHA, LP MANIF/1, William Rodgers to Alec McGivan, 15 November 1979; Kenneth Morgan, 
interview with the author, 17 October 1997.
30 William Rodgers to Alec McGivan, 15 November 1979; Hayter, Fightback, 50, 56–7.
31 Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP: The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford, 
1997), 24.
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they have continued to have a clean sweep’.32 Buoyed by such successes, the 
group broadened its rationale and objectives beyond the mere organization of 
the right-wing slate in PLP elections. Elected offi cer posts within the group 
were established, and a full-time researcher was appointed to collate material 
for the purpose of publishing Manifesto Group policy statements ‘intended 
to spread its ideas about democratic socialism much more widely’.33 The 
broader purpose was to extend the role and scope of the Manifesto Group 
‘to include discussion of Government policy and of democratic socialism in 
general’, and to offer a contribution to the battle of ideas in the party, particu-
larly in the critical areas of economic and industrial policy. Consequently, the 
group undertook to publish a number of statements and papers ‘on matters of 
current interest’ and as a ‘contribution to debate in the party’.34
The principles of democratic socialism and social democratic ‘renewal’: 
revisionist social democracy and a ‘third way’ in the 1970s
In addition to the initial party strategic aim and the objective to defend the 
manifesto platform on which the Labour government had been elected to 
grapple with the mounting economic challenge, the broader purpose of the 
Manifesto Group was to prompt a post-revisionist ‘modernising’ ambition to 
both uphold the traditional principles of democratic socialism and re-evaluate 
social democratic philosophy and policy in shifting economic, social, and 
political circumstances.35 The wider aims and objectives of the group beyond 
intra-party organization included a supportive motion to defend the policies 
presented in the Labour manifesto and help to sustain the Labour government 
to overcome the current ‘acute economic diffi culties’.36 
Given the relatively left-wing nature of the party’s manifesto, there was 
some irony in both the group’s choice of name and intention to uphold the 
document on which the Labour government had been elected in 1974. On 
32 John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson, 27 February 1978. 
33 BLPES, Sandelson 6/1, Neville Sandelson to Manifesto Group members, n.d.; John Wakefi eld to 
Paul Adamson, 27 February 1978.
34 John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson, 27 February 1978; John Wakefi eld to Roger Poole, 23 January 
1979; George Robertson to Ron Hayward, March 1980; Manifesto Group, What We Must Do; 
Manifesto Group, Priorities for Labour; LP/MANIF/3, Manifesto Group, The Future of Counter-In-
fl ation Policy, January 1979.
35 See Tony Blair, Let Us Face the Future – The 1945 Anniversary Lecture (London, 1995), 1, 3–5, 9, 
10–13, 14.
36 LHA, LP/MANIF/15, memo headed ‘The committee proposes’, n.d.; LP/MANIF/4, ‘Notes and 
(supporting) statement of Manifesto Group meeting’, 15 June 1977; George Robertson to Ron 
Hayward, March 1980; Sandelson, ‘The Manifesto Group’.
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the one hand, it was representative of the growing defensiveness of moderate 
party opinion in expressing its loyalty to the moderate party leadership and 
locating itself broadly within the Labour Party tradition. On the other, it 
represented a reluctant acceptance of, rather than explicit support for, Labour’s 
manifesto. Although this was as far as most members of the Manifesto Group 
were prepared to go, it offered something of social democracy to defend.37 
However, the rationale and role of the Manifesto Group was more than that 
of a mere ‘rubber stamp’ for the government. It was also both an attempt to 
uphold and reassert the ‘democratic socialist principles’ of the party against 
what were perceived to be the inherent dangers to economic and political 
order of the resurgent ‘far left’ and to provide a social democratic revisionist 
‘modernising’ forum ‘to relate democratic socialist philosophy to the needs 
of the present age’ and attempt to intercept the parallel challenge of the new 
‘Tory Right’.38
The group’s initial statement of philosophy and policy, What We Must Do: 
A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’s Crisis (1977), demonstrated the twin 
aims of its wider prospectus to offer discussion of both current economic and 
political themes and the development and direction of social democracy more 
generally. In the immediate and likely future economic context, the statement 
consistently stressed ‘the importance of wealth creation, restraining public 
expenditure and … holding down wage claims to within the Chancellor’s 
limits’. The document restated the group’s faith in limited planning and the 
mixed economy but, in accord with an emerging ‘liberal’ social democratic 
political economy of the Labour right increasingly sensitive to the tax and 
spend limits at ‘the frontiers of social democracy’, repudiated increased public 
expenditure and simple redistribution of wealth.39 Instead, it emphasized the 
importance of wealth creation as a centrepiece of social democratic political 
economy and as a stimulus of economic growth: ‘Progressive taxation and 
increased public expenditure have been pursued with too little regard for 
overall cost and too optimistic a view of the likely benefi ts.’ Wealth creation 
37 Financial Times, 9 March 1977; John Horam, interview with the author, 16 February 2001.
38 Manifesto Group, ‘The committee proposes’; George Robertson to Ron Hayward, March 1980; 
John Wakefi eld to Paul Adamson, 3 February 1978 and 27 February 1978; John Wakefi eld to 
Roger Poole, 23 January 1979; LHA, LP/MANIF/23, John Wakefi eld to Patrick Seyd, 13 March 
1978; LP/MANIF/25, John Wakefi eld to Patrick McSharry, 18 August 1978; John Wakefi eld to 
R.F. Atkins, 17 January 1979; BLPES, Sandelson 6/1, Manifesto Group, ‘Phase four: where to go 
from here’; Financial Times, 9 March 1977.
39 See Stephen Meredith, ‘Labour Party revisionism and public expenditure: Divisions of Social 
Democratic political economy in the 1970s’, Labour History Review, 70 (2005), 254, 259, 262; 
Shirley Williams, interview with the author, 25 June 2002; William Rodgers, interview with the 
author, 18 February 2001.
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‘must be given a new priority that it had never previously achieved in socialist 
thinking’.40 A revisionist social democratic perspective between the poles of 
left and right, willing to loosen ties to traditional policies and mechanisms and 
adapt to new limits and the need for reform, suggested that only an updated 
application of the principles of moderate democratic socialism could deliver 
‘the radical, sweeping and integrated economic and social changes necessary 
to reverse the process of Britain’s economic decline’, low growth and rate 
of infl ation, their unanticipated social consequences and the accompanying 
‘institutional rigidities’ that lay behind them, and still preserve fundamental 
concepts of individual freedom and social equality.41 Principal themes of 
ideological and programmatic renewal were accompanied by an appeal for 
renewal of Britain’s institutional and social structure and attitudes as a driver of 
economic recovery, echoing Harold Wilson’s earlier focus on a ‘new Britain’ 
devoid of ‘restrictive’ attitudes and practices and ‘New’ Labour’s later ‘new 
Labour new Britain’ embodiment of wider institutional and national renewal.
In effect, it represented a ‘modernising’ agenda – even a ‘middle way’ or ‘a 
third possible course’ – within a broadly social democratic framework.42 Given 
the signifi cant younger revisionist (and Jenkinsite) component of Manifesto 
Group membership, it was in no small way an attempt to update Crosland’s 
seminal social democratic revisionism for the prevailing circumstances of 
unanticipated economic conditions of low economic growth and high 
infl ation (which Crosland himself appeared unable or unwilling to do). In the 
adverse conditions of low economic growth, increasing unemployment, and 
high infl ation, it was Crosland’s, and Labour’s, seemingly unreconstructed 
reliance on traditional forms of Keynesian demand management and the 
high priority afforded to public spending and high and progressive levels 
of taxation in pursuit of redistributive policies to achieve the aim of greater 
economic and social equality, that provided a focus of the Manifesto Group’s 
social democratic revisionism.
While members of the Manifesto Group were very largely in favour of high 
levels of public expenditure as the basis of ‘a prosperous and civilised society’ 
in conditions of stronger economic growth, it also warned of the potentially 
damaging consequences of high levels of taxation and public expenditure 
‘against a background of slow or stagnant growth’. Developing the emerging 
Jenkinsite theme of the potential dangers to freedoms of increased public 
40 Manifesto Group, What We Must Do, 12; The Times, 30 September 1977.
41 Manifesto Group, What We Must Do, 5–6, 7–9, 10–12, 13; Manifesto Group, ‘Economic report’, 
27 February 1975; Financial Times, 9 March 1977; The Times, 30 September 1977.
42 See Daily Telegraph, 9 March 1977.
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spending as a proportion of GDP, the group’s initial statement took the 
analysis a stage further to question some of the wider principles of public 
expenditure. In particular, it questioned the unplanned and wasteful aspects 
of increases in public expenditure, and even the reliability of its redistributive 
effects, and warned of the danger of a ‘taxpayers backlash … against the whole 
idea of the Welfare State’.43 
Manifesto Group statements did not argue for a retreat from the considered 
use of public expenditure and role of the state, but suggested that 
it is because we believe in socially valuable public expenditure that we think 
there should be greater scrutiny of it. Indiscriminate cuts in public spending 
made in hasty response to economic crisis often have harmful consequences for 
our social fabric [but] … much greater attention should be paid to preventing 
wasteful public spending, to looking at ways of getting greater cost benefi t 
from spending and ending public programmes which change has rendered 
unnecessary.44
A hint of the language and approach of early ‘New’ Labour and Gordon 
Brown becomes apparent in Manifesto Group perspectives of the new prior-
ities and uses of economic policy. With the optimistic forecasts and central 
tools of social democratic political economy increasingly called into question 
in the economic conditions of the 1970s, the group emphasized a more 
permanent rather than contingent focus on infl ation and monetary control as 
the new way to stability and growth and more focused use of public and social 
expenditure. These themes proposed in a Labour context broadly correspond 
to the representations of ‘New’ Labour on the new ‘rules’ of economic 
engagement and useful deployment of the proceeds of economic growth 
and limits of untrammelled public expenditure. In his speech to a memorial 
meeting for Tony Crosland in February 1997, Brown outlined his views of 
the ‘changing context of equality’, in which the principle of a ‘rise in public 
spending does not necessarily equate with meeting the public interest’ in the 
same way that in 1956 ‘increased public ownership was not synonymous with 
the public interest’, equality, and social justice.45
Although his observations remained largely undeveloped for the ‘hard 
times’ of the 1970s, Crosland himself noted the uncertainties of the benefi ts of 
43 Manifesto Group, What We Must Do, 12, 22–4; also see Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: 
Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1991), 209, 231; Philip Whitehead, The Writing on 
the Wall: Britain in the Seventies (London, 1985), 346. 
44 LHA, LP/MANIF/3, Manifesto Group, ‘Keep on course: A statement of economic policy’, 27 
October 1976.
45 Gordon Brown, ‘Equality – then and now’, in Dick Leonard (ed.), Crosland and New Labour 
(Basingstoke, 1999), 35–48.
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spending and that social democrats were faced with the uncomfortable notion 
that ‘a shift from private spending to public spending does not necessarily 
increase equality.’ According to Brown, ‘the record since 1979’ had shown that 
‘increased spending does not necessarily increase social justice,’ that ‘you can 
tax, spend, borrow … and [still] fail’, and central Manifesto Group themes had 
begun to address, unravel, and advertise some of these uncomfortable devel-
opments and embryonic revisions of social democratic political economy.46 
The largely unheralded Manifesto Group proposals for a stable economy for 
growth without severe infl ationary and unemployment pressures, through 
the pursuit and maintenance of a ‘fi rm, anti-infl ationary monetary policy’ 
encompassing a clearer framework of pay and wage bargaining, refl ected a 
strategy to charter a ‘third’ possible course of revisionist social democracy 
between the similarly ‘chaotic free-for-all’ options of new right and left, 
emphasizing ‘modernising’ sentiments that present policies needed to be (re)
considered by government, party, and movement, up-dated and refashioned 
for a purpose for the future.47
Equally, it is possible to detect an emerging interest in the ‘supply-side’ 
economy in Manifesto Group proposals rather than the conventional focus 
on demand of social democratic political economy. Though the ‘obvious 
response to signs of sluggishness in the economy is to call for a stimulus to 
demand’, while there is both ‘greatly under-used capacity, particularly of 
human skill’ and ‘unsatisfi ed human want’, it ‘must be our ambition to build 
a growing economy which develops and employs that supply in providing 
for that demand’.48 A further latent ‘New’ Labour theme of the Manifesto 
Group refl ected a growing awareness of the dilemmas of the ‘trade union 
question’ and shifting attitudes to the ‘position of special power’ enjoyed by 
trade unions in the limits to which they believed the government should 
accede to the demands of narrow trade union interests of ‘irresponsible wage 
bargaining’ in a diffi cult national economic climate, and the need for social 
democracy and the Labour Party to explicitly adopt and present a ‘national’ 
rather than sectional perspective and appeal.49 Some members of the group 
46 Manifesto Group, ‘Keep on course’; National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS), Edinburgh, 
John P. Mackintosh Papers, 323/139, Manifesto Group, ‘Economic policy’, 13 March 1978; 
LHA, LP/MANIF/3, Manifesto Group, ‘Statement on the budget’, 11 April 1978; also see Brown, 
‘Equality’, 37–9; Anthony Crosland, Social Democracy in Europe (London, 1975); Anthony Crosland, 
‘Equality in hard times’, Socialist Commentary, October 1976, 3.
47 Manifesto Group, ‘The future of counter-infl ation policy’, LHA, LP/MANIF/3, Manifesto 
Group, ‘Statement on the TUC General Council statement, “A better way”’, 1 February 1979. 
48 Manifesto Group, ‘Economic policy’.
49 Manifesto Group, ‘Statement on the TUC General Council statement’; LHA, LP/MANIF/3, 
Manifesto Group, Statement, 15 November 1978; Minkin, Contentious Alliance, 209–10.
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were even more explicit in their belief that a future social democratic party 
(of whatever form), freed from the institutional constraints and conservative 
limitations of the trade unions, ‘would be free to press for what it saw as the 
national interest’ and could be ‘far more radical on many issues’.50
Additional attempts were made to both emphasize the Manifesto Group’s 
‘third way’ approach and augment its own radical Labour/social democratic 
credentials by taking up the wider battle of ideas with the publication of a 
clear anti-Conservative statement in June 1978 attacking new Conservative 
ideas and policies. The Wrong Approach: An Exposure of Conservative Policies 
was essentially an attempt to provide the Manifesto Group with an offensive 
anti-Thatcherite as well as a defensive anti-left position, and to emphasize 
the alternative appeal of an updated moderate social democracy willing to 
accept a reassessment of the precepts of social democratic industrial relations 
and political economy in conditions of low growth, but not the perceived 
vagaries and inequalities induced by the New Right’s laissez-faire principles 
of the ‘Invisible Hand of the market mechanism’ in industrial and economic 
policy. Again, in an attempt to charter a responsive centre-right ideological 
position in the Labour Party in the post-IMF environment in which ‘Keynes-
ianism had been defeated and old-style Croslandism-in-one-country was in 
disarray,’ the Manifesto Group pursued a ‘third way’ course something akin 
to a ‘kind of marriage between Keynesianism and Monetarism’.51 It is perhaps 
no coincidence, with the left largely routed, that the group faded in the party 
by the mid-1980s as the ‘Kinnockite’ Policy Review process and the course 
of Labour’s social democratic modernization gradually addressed, and thus 
removed, its raison d’être.
As they approached the more immediate juncture of the 1979 election 
contest with Thatcherism and the foreseeable future, the ‘priorities for Labour’ 
and a modernized social democracy were to plot a moderate, responsive 
and realistic social democratic course between the perceived excesses of a 
‘tried [and] failed’ and likely disruptive ‘laissez-faire Tory ideology’ and the 
outdated and unrealistic proposals of the Labour left’s AES, involving massive 
and unaffordable refl ation, ‘greatly increased import controls, nationalisation 
and compulsory planning agreements’. In the context of government-led 
economic success centred around the principle and ‘only realistic policy’ of 
‘cooperation and partnership, not just between a Labour Government and the 
50 John P. Mackintosh, ‘Socialism or social democracy?’, 483–4; also see John P. Mackintosh, ‘The 
case for a realignment of the left’, The Times, 22 July 1977.
51 Manifesto Group, ‘The future of counter-infl ation policy’; Manifesto Group, ‘Phase four’; Mani-
festo Group, ‘Priorities for Labour’; Hayter, Fightback, 56.
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trade unions, but between unions and industrialists, and between both and 
government’, the group advocated a ‘permanent incomes policy’ as a weapon 
to fi ght infl ation and a more sophisticated approach to the debate on public 
spending beyond the mere quantitative arguments of right and left. The 
Conservative argument that public spending inherently presents a burden on 
freedoms is unacceptable because ‘many less wealthy people depend on public 
services for the limited freedoms they do enjoy.’ The aim to increase public 
spending to enhance wider freedoms and opportunities remains, but ‘the 
money can only be found out of real resources, through taxes and borrowing. 
It cannot be conjured out of thin air, and that’s why we dispute the left’s view’ 
as ‘they simply beg the question of economic growth and close their eyes to 
the infl ationary consequences of their policies.’52
Other modernizing themes of the Manifesto Group’s vision refl ected some 
of the later ‘prudence for a purpose’ rhetoric of Gordon Brown, indicating 
that public spending for the pursuit of ‘Social justice and better provision for 
those in need and who depend on it’ remained central to social democracy, 
but with the strong proviso that it had ‘to be paid for’. ‘[E]ffective and effi -
cient public spending’ and ‘effi cient public use of resources’ within a vibrant 
growing economy would have to underpin grand social democratic values.53 
These further proposals included reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and review of Britain’s budgetary commitment to the EEC, both in the 
economic context of the argument ‘for the effi cient public use of resources’ 
and the political context of fostering ‘popular support’ for Britain to remain 
in the Community and developing a more stable pro-European position; 
encouragement of new enterprise, tax reform, and greater appreciation of 
the ‘importance of incentives and differentials’, which would be ‘vital if the 
British economy is to grow more strongly’; and more industrial democracy 
as a means of fostering ‘greater cooperation between all sides of industry’, 
involving ‘new responsibilities on trade unionists’ and ‘internal trade union 
reform’, in pursuit of ‘more productive, effi cient and less disrupted industry’. 
The Manifesto Group’s fi nal rallying call immediately prior to the 1979 general 
election was not too dissimilar to some of the introductory and explanatory 
language of ‘New’ Labour. It suggested that if a (Labour) government applied 
‘economic and industrial policies that work’, Britain could become 
a more equal society, a less divided society, a society in which people gain 
more control over their lives, more choice over how they spend their time 
52 Manifesto Group, ‘The future of counter-infl ation policy’; Manifesto Group, ‘Priorities for Labour’.
53 Gordon Brown, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 308, 17 March 1998, 111; Manifesto Group, 
‘Priorities for Labour’.
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and their money … We have addressed ourselves … to … how to make the 
British industrial economy stronger, and how to release the imaginative and 
creative forces in British society that have so long been underused. On these 
practical, workable policies … Labour can create the opportunity of a fuller 
life for everyone.54
The limited overall impact of Manifesto Group proposals at the time refl ected 
both the wider fraught context and polarized battle of ideas and the continued 
advance of the left in the policy-making apparatus of the party, particu-
larly after 1979. It also refl ected to some extent the consequences for the 
Manifesto Group’s coherence and compass of the inability of its ‘paralysingly 
diverse’ centre-right membership to adopt a unifi ed approach to wider key 
themes such as the European issue and position on the Common Market.55 
If the Manifesto Group outlook failed to ignite ‘a new philosophical and 
political revival within the Labour Party’ advocated by social democrats in 
the revisionist tradition, such as David Owen, and failed to offer a wider 
prospectus and engage explicitly with emerging preoccupations of liberal 
social democracy around related themes of ‘decentralisation and democracy’ 
both within and without the Labour movement, it was an attempt to elevate 
perspectives beyond ‘our own internal constitutional and organisational 
problems’ and offer a ‘laudable modernising’ objective to reassess the focus, 
priorities, and distribution of moderate revisionist social democratic political 
economy in the wake of ‘new and unanticipated’ conditions. In this respect, 
they emphasized the destructive tendencies of free collective bargaining and 
the appeal of a permanent but fl exible incomes policy and pay norm, a new 
priority and ‘more fi rmness and consistency’ in economic policy on anti-in-
fl ationary measures and tighter monetary policy, and a reassessment of the 
possibilities of public expenditure in conditions of low growth in a way that 
would prevent public spending as a share of GDP reaching ‘levels which 
would imperil “freedom” in society’. As part of this process and the wider 
‘modernising’ agenda, the group called for a broader shift to overcome ‘a 
profound resistance to change’ in the ‘backward-looking’ national psyche 
and national institutions (à la ‘new Labour new Britain’).56
54 Manifesto Group, ‘The future of counter-infl ation policy’; Manifesto Group, ‘Priorities for 
Labour’; Hayter, Fightback, 57.
55 Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism, 171–2; LHA, LP/MANIF/25, Ian Wrigglesworth to J.P. Smith, 
18 March 1977; John Wakefi eld to Francois Xavier Camenon, 17 January 1979, Manifesto.
56 LHA, LP/MANIF/24, extract from speech delivered by David Owen to the Northfi eld Constit-
uency Labour Party dinner, Birmingham, 29 February 1980; Manifesto Group, ‘Phase four’; 
Manifesto Group, ‘Priorities for Labour’; Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism, 172.
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From New Labour to ‘New’ Labour
the Manifesto Group of centre-Right Labour MPs published a pamphlet … 
it hopes will … bring up to date the principles of Democratic Socialism … 
Unlike most Labour documents, the pamphlet … puts the emphasis on wealth 
creation rather than the distribution of wealth … wealth creation must be 
given a priority which it had never previously had in Socialist thinking … 
Parts of the new pamphlet read as if they had been drafted in Conservative 
Central Offi ce. ‘The principal object of economic and industrial policy is to 
produce an atmosphere in which innovation thrives, risks are worth taking, 
profi tability is satisfactory, and effi ciency is a habit.’57
The Manifesto Group should be seen perhaps as an important (and neglected) 
indirect, rather than direct, infl uence on the emergence of ‘New’ Labour, 
given its ultimately very temporary existence and largely strategic internal 
organizational role in the party up to 1983 and subsequent reproduction of 
much of its platform by the seemingly more interesting secessionist SDP,58 
and given the more general diffi culty of linking the infl uence and relationship 
of sets of ideas across time, context, and personnel. 
However, there is a sense in which it is possible to chart the more indirect 
trajectory of the essence of Manifesto Group proposals to their ‘New’ Labour 
destination through the complex and circuitous route and schisms of social 
democracy in the 1980s and 1990s – from core Manifesto Group themes and 
ideas as a post-revisionist social democratic pressure group of the Labour right 
in the 1970s, through the formation of a new alternative social democratic 
vehicle involving some of the group’s members and sympathizers and David 
Owen’s repositioning of the SDP after the 1983 election, and through the 
Owenite SDP to Labour’s belated attempts at ‘renewal’ and Policy Review 
after 1987 and the modernisers of ‘New’ Labour in the mid-1990s. In this 
respect, Owen’s concept of the ‘social market’ offers a useful route map of 
the trajectory and migration of post-revisionist themes and ideas through the 
various twists and turns of British social democracy from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-1990s.
If the Manifesto Group was attempting to achieve a new ‘marriage 
between Keynesianism and Monetarism’,59 and new social democratic balance 
between effi ciency and social justice, Owen’s ‘social market economy’ or 
‘social market’ theme was an attempt to defi ne and consolidate the ‘need 
57 Guardian, 9 March 1977; Manifesto Group, What We Must Do, 19.
58 Hayter, Fightback, 49–73; Crewe and King, SDP, 24, 90.
59 Hayter, Fightback, 55–6.
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to create a new synthesis of ideas’ to maintain the ‘values and attitudes’ of 
previous centre-left theorists in the new political climate and agenda of the 
1980s.60 Emerging New Right free market themes and ideas promulgated by 
Keith Joseph and the Conservative Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) required 
a response and adaptation in Labour’s own political thinking and social demo-
cratic evolution. The fi rst draft attempt to merge previously contradictory 
or ambiguous themes of social democratic political economy was that of the 
Manifesto Group in a ‘cold climate’ and largely hostile party environment. 
Owen’s ‘social market’ represented a more theorized and coherent attempt 
to apply the new synergies implicit in the concept to the social democratic 
model from a seemingly loftier or more independent revisionist vantage 
point.61 Owen’s prescriptions consistently echoed earlier nascent and cautious 
Manifesto Group themes around greater economic and industrial effi ciency 
involving a more forward-looking commercial climate and a greater role for 
markets, control of infl ation, and careful review of the structure, culture, and 
commitments of the public sector. Control of infl ation, greater national and 
international competiveness, ‘economic adjustment’ for wealth creation, and 
critique (from the centre-left) of high levels of public expenditure, under-
pinned by the role and operation of the market, were essential to the revival 
of the British economy and effective policies of social justice. In his own way, 
‘Owen was attempting to create a new “third way” for the 1980s,’ and his 
attempt to present a synthesis that adapted to new market economic condi-
tions and maintain a strong, if more prudent, commitment to social justice 
found favourable comparison with the likes of Roy Hattersley and revisionist 
social democrats still in the Labour Party.62
The further migration of these post-revisionist social democratic ideas and 
proposals can be identifi ed in their eventual manifestation in the ‘renewal’ of 
Labour’s ideological and policy platform after the 1987 election defeat and 
in their further development by the arch modernisers of ‘New’ Labour. For 
instance, Neil Kinnock described the ‘big idea’ behind Labour’s 1989 Policy 
Review as the ‘the combination of social justice and economic effi ciency’, an 
overarching theme obviously close to Owen’s ‘social market’ of ‘economic 
effi ciency through market allocation’, and more emphasis on wealth creation 
60 See Dean Blackburn, ‘Facing the future? David Owen and Social Democracy in the 1980s and 
beyond’, Parliamentary Affairs, 64 (2011), 634–5.
61 See Duncan Brack, ‘David Owen and the Social Market Economy’, Political Quarterly, 61 (1990), 
465; Matthew Lakin, ‘David Owen, New Labour and the social market economy: The renewal of 
Social Democratic politics’, Social Market Foundation, (London, 2009) (http://www.smf.co.uk/
assets/fi les/Dissertation_Lakin.pdf: accessed 1 October 2010).
62 Brack, ‘David Owen’, 465–8; David Owen, Social Market and Social Justice (London, 1987).
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plus social justice via relative redistribution, and Manifesto Group analysis 
before it.63 The attempts of, fi rst, the Manifesto Group of centre-right Labour 
MPs and then David Owen to reposition Labour and the SDP respectively 
on ‘less familiar social democratic territory’, which involved reappraisal of 
conventional demand management and public expenditure policies, recog-
nition of enterprise and wealth creation, and the infl uence and role of the 
market and private sector as ‘necessary recognition that times had changed’, 
also found some resonance among the modernisers of early ‘New’ Labour.64 
There are broad thematic similarities in the revisionist social democratic 
lineage from the Manifesto Group through the Owenite SDP in particular 
and Labour’s post-1987 programmatic ‘renewal’ to ‘New’ Labour. Although 
it remains problematic to identify and measure precise points and infl uence 
of intellectual heritage, there is a sense in which various attempts to unearth a 
new synergy of social democratic ideas and plot a new ‘third way’ course on 
unchartered social democratic terrain were more than just ‘a by-product of 
their similar ideological trajectories’.65 Their eventually explicit and dominant 
manifestation and expression in ‘New’ Labour conceals a longer social demo-
cratic revisionist ‘third way’ trajectory of common substantive roots back to 
the marginalized, neglected, and pioneering Manifesto Group.
Conclusion
The Manifesto Group represented a clear attempt at factional organization on 
the parliamentary Labour right from late 1974. Although generally moderate 
in its ideas and proposals, attempting to steer an economic course between 
the extremes of left-wing collectivism and Thatcherite neo-liberalism, and 
founded initially as a focal point for ‘moderate’ unity and organization against 
the Labour left in the PLP, the Manifesto Group was not a parliamentary 
Labour right faction in the conventional leadership-loyalist sense. It was also 
eager to display its relative independence from the government and voted 
against it on a number of occasions between 1974 and 1979, as it considered 
it important to be seen as a conditional supporter of the government.66 
The Manifesto Group perceived itself to be only a ‘critical friend’ of the 
Labour government. In the context of the acute economic diffi culties of the 
63 Brack, ‘David Owen’, 463.
64 Mandelson and Liddle, Blair Revolution, 28–9.
65 See Blackburn, ‘Facing the future’, 647.
66 John Horam, interview with the author.
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mid-1970s, it urged the government to develop a fi rmer line on the need to 
review fundamental aspects of traditional social democratic political economy 
and the ‘old … social democratic subsumption of labourist economism’ in its 
support for ‘a permanent but fl exible incomes policy [and] a careful review of 
public expenditure and anti-infl ation measures’. A range of internal Manifesto 
Group statements on economic policy provided clear support of the govern-
ment’s strategy to reduce infl ation in order to create economic stability and 
foster economic growth and pursue an emerging post-Croslandite revisionist 
social democratic agenda. They stress the reduction of infl ation as the key 
target of economic policy as the only way towards economic stability, growth, 
and effi ciency, and as the basis of stable employment and increased but effi cient 
public expenditure.67
The general direction of Manifesto Group economic policy statements was 
threefold: fi rst, clear acknowledgement of the limitations of traditional social 
democratic economic tools and methods in post-OPEC conditions; second, 
explicit and extensive criticism of the general helpfulness and implicit dangers 
of left-inspired alternative economic strategies of ‘unilateral’ import controls 
or ‘a large competitive depreciation of sterling’; third, tentative proposals for 
cautious ‘internationally co-ordinated’ growth and refl ation. In this respect, 
immediate priorities would be the control and further reduction of infl ation by 
means of ‘continuing restraint in wage bargaining’ and the need for some form 
of institutionalized ‘fl exible incomes policy’ and ‘fi rm monetary control’.68 In 
so far as the group offered positive policy ideas and proposals, it encouraged 
an increased emphasis in social democratic philosophy and political economy 
on the control of infl ation, clearer guidelines for the control of wage demands 
and public expenditure, and a new focus on wealth creation as opposed to 
wealth (re)distribution and wider issues of individual choice and freedom.
This ‘new’ social democratic thinking not only set core members of the 
Manifesto Group apart from increasingly centrist ‘egalitarian’ social demo-
crats such as Crosland and Hattersley, but gives some credence to the idea 
of, if not a wholesale paradigm shift in economic policy in the direction of 
neo-liberal monetarism and the fracture of the post-war Keynesian social 
democratic consensus, then some sort of philosophical sea-change in the 
basis and purpose of social democratic economic policy. While such ideas 
67 LHA, LP/MANIF/3, John Wakefi eld, ‘Public expenditure cuts: The chancellor’s remarks 
and further comments’, 12 July 1976; Manifesto Group, ‘Keep on course’; Manifesto Group, 
‘Statement on the budget’; Manifesto Group, Statement, 15 November 1978; David Marquand, 
John Mackintosh, David Owen, ‘Change gear! Towards a socialist strategy’, Socialist Commentary, 
October 1967, iv–v; Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism, 156–7, 172. 
68 Manifesto Group, ‘Economic policy’, 4–5, 9–14.
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still played at the margins of social democratic thought and practice, Labour 
now appeared more willing to address intrinsic limitations of traditional social 
democratic political economy in the circumstances of the 1970s, to consider 
the need to adapt fundamental aspects of economic thinking to the new 
conditions, and even to reconceptualize the balance of guiding principles in 
the direction of greater emphasis on individual freedom.
Beyond its internal success against the Tribune Group in the organization 
of the right-wing ‘slate’ for PLP elections, some of the constraints and limited 
impact of the Manifesto Group refl ected rifts over the divisive issue of Europe 
and emerging differences with the wider Labour right tendency of the PLP 
in the 1970s. For instance, it contained within its (seventy plus) membership 
a diverse range of broadly centre-right Labour MPs and opinion, including 
both liberal revisionist Jenkinsites and loyalist centrists hesitant to veer too far 
away from social democratic orthodoxy. The Manifesto Group struggled to 
have much wider impact at the time, given the diversity and constraints of 
its internal organization and the fact that, by this stage, it appeared that both 
inside and outside the party the tide of ideas was against it. Perhaps lacking 
coherent membership and a wider intellectual purpose beyond its position as 
a ‘critical friend’ of the Labour government and discussion of the ‘minutiae 
of anti-infl ation policy – demanding more fi rmness and consistency’, the 
majority of the Manifesto Group membership was less concerned to develop 
a wider coherent set of principles, ideas, and proposals, within the context of 
a comprehensive statement of social democratic intent appropriate to the new 
conditions, than (perhaps inevitably) with the immediate priority to maintain 
the Labour government and a moderate democratic socialist programme in 
offi ce and to stem the left-wing tide in the party. 
In the challenging circumstances of ‘new and unanticipated [economic] 
problems’, the Manifesto Group focused largely on the need for ‘careful 
review of public expenditure and anti-infl ation measures’ and the need for 
a fl exible but permanent incomes policy.69 Although invitations to speakers 
and the agendas of Manifesto Group meetings reveal a desire to expand 
the prospectus of political discussion on occasion (to issues such as devo-
lution), the majority of meetings and all signifi cant internal documentation 
were devoted to issues of infl ation and public expenditure.70 The limited 
69 Manifesto Group, ‘Economic policy’, 4–5, 9–14.
70 In addition to its general policy statements, see Marquand, ‘Economic situation’; Manifesto Group, 
‘Keep on course’; Manifesto Group, ‘Statement on the budget’; LHA, LP/MANIF/3, Manifesto 
Group, ‘After phase two’, June 1977; LP/MANIF/4, Ian Wrigglesworth, Notes of Manifesto 
Group meeting, 1 December, 1976; Notes of Manifesto Group meeting, 8 December 1976; 
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concerns of the Manifesto Group were perhaps understandable given national 
priorities and the group’s originally limited ambition to support the Labour 
government in the interests of right-wing unity against the challenge of the 
new Labour left. Wider aspirations to develop and propose a more inclusive 
set of ideas and proposals, beyond the odd ‘laudable modernising sentiment’ 
and the defensive, moderate ‘middle course’ between the economic extremes 
of left and right, was curtailed to some extent by a combination of its defensive 
position, the priorities and wider confl icts and arguments of the prevailing 
context and the diversity and tensions of group membership. Nevertheless, 
core Manifesto Group themes and initiatives, temporarily diverted via alter-
native social democratic vehicles, reappeared in the early vision and statements 
of ‘New’ Labour in the wake of the party’s own long revisionist modernizing 
trajectory. 
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